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Abstract: What can be done to make informal finance and microfinance suitable
for financing growing small to medium size enterprises (SMEs) in Sub-Saharan
Africa? First, I present the characteristics of informal finance, focusing on size,
structure, and scope of activities. Informal finance has not been very attractive for
the private sector. Indeed, the informal sector has considerable experience and
knowledge about dealing with small borrowers, but there are significant limitations
to what it can lend to growing microbusinesses. Second, I discuss some recent
trends in microfinance. While externally driven microfinance projects have surfaced in Africa, their performance relative to small business finance has not been as
positive as in Asia and Latin America. Third, I introduce some possible steps
toward a new reform agenda that will make informal and microfinance relevant to
private sector development, including focusing on links among formal, semi-formal and informal finance and how these links can be developed.

I

n this section I explore the characteristics of informal finance
that make it difficult for it to be accessed by Sub-Saharan
African enterprises. “Informal finance” might be defined as
embracing all financial transactions taking place beyond various
countries’ regulations on banking and other financial sectors. This
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definition includes a wide range of financial activity whose operational scope differs across countries. Indeed, there is a wide variety
of informal savings and lending in the region.
The definition of informal finance includes such schemes as the
operations of Savings and Credit Associations (SCA), known all over
Africa; professional moneylenders; part-time moneylenders (estate
owners, traders, grain millers, smallholder farmers, employers, relations and friends); mobile bankers, known as susu or esusu collectors in
West Africa; credit unions; and cooperative societies. These exist in
both urban and rural areas. While savings collectors fall under the first
category of deposit mobilizers, moneylenders—including relations
and friends—do not generally accept deposits and may be assigned to
a second category. SCAs (credit unions and credit cooperatives) take in
deposits and also lend in varied forms. Most informal units deal with
specific groups of people, ensuring that only those satisfy distinct selection criteria are able to either deposit with them or borrow from them.

Who Can Borrow from Whom?
There is extreme segmentation in Sub-Saharan financial markets,
“fragmented” because the various segments serve distinct groups of
clients with similar characteristics and needs, and there is hardly any
interaction among different institutions. The negative effects of weak
linkages among segments far outweigh benefits of any specialization
they could make available through the existence of segments.
Fragmentation is indicated by wide differences in interest rates, as
well as insignificant flows of funds between segments, limiting
access to funds by potential clients. Because funds of different
lenders can hardly be substituted for one another, fragmented markets
have difficulty intermediating between savers and investors. In not
being able to allocate financial resources, they cannot always transform
and distribute risks and maturities efficiently. As a consequence,
deposits mobilized, as well as credit facilities, differ in structure, associating demand and usage with distinct socioeconomic groups.
Professor Ernest Aryeetey is Director of the Institute of Statistical, Social, and Economic
Research (ISSER) at the University of Ghana, Legon, Ghana. Email address:
isser@ug.edu.gh
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Credit from moneylenders is often the most expensive credit
available, hence demand comes from persons with no other options.
Such credit remains, nevertheless, the only source of informal credit
that does not require borrowers to satisfy specific membership
obligations. Despite the relatively high probability of loan requests
being granted, short maturity periods and high interest rates do not
make this credit attractive for those seeking working capital and
fixed investment loans. In most of rural West Africa, for instance,
clientele is wide ranging—farmers, market women, other traders,
nonfarm entrepreneurs, and other self-employed craftsmen. Farmers
sometimes borrow money from moneylenders during the planting
season to maintain their households until the next harvest. They
may also borrow for funerals and other social events. While rural
households usually borrow from their own communities, they
sometimes travel far to borrow from a moneylender.
SCAs’ credit facilities are used mainly for consumption, even
though they sometimes provide working capital. In Malawi, however,
the use of cooperative loans for financing farm working capital
outweighs use for consumption, as these are mainly for fertilizer
purchase and payment for farm labor (Chipeta & Mkandawire,
1991). A small loan for a short period has to be used for an activity
that has a quick turnover, such as cereal production. Group membership is an essential tool for screening loan applications and for
ensuring that contracts can be enforced. For many associations,
limitations to growth in size are imposed by expected increased risk
and increased probability of losing homogeneity as the group
expands. Homogeneity provides them with a sense of familiarity,
engendering mutual trust. Some rotating savings and credit associations (ROSCAs) intentionally do not put together people with too
different backgrounds and interests. Size limitation restricts capital
to those borrowers whose demand for loans is not regular—e.g.,
those requiring loans to purchase a relatively expensive consumption
item.
Savings (susu) collectors grant “advances” to some trusted clients.
Other loan recipients might be traders at local markets in need of
short-term credit. When collectors lend to non-deposit clients, terms
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are often different from those of their deposit clients; they tend to
behave as moneylenders.

How Does Informal Sector Lending
to the Private Sector Work?
A number of recent studies reveal adequately that there has been
substantial growth in the activities of the informal financial sector
since reforms began in many Sub-Saharan African countries (e.g.,
Steel, Aryeetey, Hettige, & Nissanke, 1996; World Bank, 1994).1
Unfortunately, while the informal sector has grown and is willing to
increase lending, its products are not necessarily what the growing
small private sector demands.
There appears to be greater diversification in activity among
some informal institutions in attempts to reach out to more borrowers than is observed among formal institutions even after reforms.
Lending by SCAs has become part of a wide and growing range of
informal financial activities that are increasing clientele, as well as
growth in institutional goals and scope, including a diversification of
clientele. Even though SCA activities have broadened, socioeconomic principles underlying their operations have not. Change in
the scope of SCA activities, as with other informal financial units,
has been induced by changing socioeconomic circumstances of
clientele or membership, and also by changes in national economies.
Significant growth in lending by SCAs and rural cooperatives has been observed in a number of countries. But the growth
of lending by commercial moneylenders has been slower than
that of the SCAs and cooperatives in West Africa. Loan applications to moneylenders in Ghana and Nigeria rose significantly in
the 1990s but rural moneylenders received more applications in
a year than did urban lenders. They granted loans to over 80%
of their loan applicants in the period. Similar experiences have
been reported in Malawi.
Urban informal commercial loan sizes in Sub-Saharan Africa
generally lie between $50 and $1000, with a median value of about
$250, and have only grown marginally in many cases. In general,
loans from moneylenders tend to be the largest in the informal sector.
16
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Urban loans are also significantly larger than rural loans. Loan sizes
for moneylenders tend to be similar across countries.
Interest rates and maturities of informal lenders often make
their loans unattractive for business. Interest rates vary widely, from
zero to more than 100% per annum, even though they often have
similarly short maturities, seldom going beyond six months. Also,
rates do not seem to change significantly with time for a large
number of informal lenders. Interest rates of Malawian
moneylenders (Katapila), for example, appear to be much higher
than in most parts of Africa. They sometimes go as high as 100%
per month. This rate has been applied for many years in Malawi. In
all countries, moneylenders have the highest lending rates.
Interest rates of moneylenders in some countries have come
down, since financial sector and economy-wide reforms in the 1990s
began in Africa. It is not obvious if this is a result of competition with
other existing lenders, leading to declining demand, or of a change in
their own supply. This has more to do with general economy-wide
alterations in economic structures. Moneylenders are changing the
scope of lending in response to the changes in the financing needs
of traditional clientele. There is increasing pressure on lenders to
provide more credit for working capital for longer periods than they
have done in the past. While this change has been observed, moneylenders’ rates remain far above other segments.
When other group-based schemes lend to nonmembers, their
rates are often comparable to those of moneylenders. This holds for
both savings collectors and SCAs in many countries. Their rates
remain far less when dealing with their members or traditional clients.
In general, loans with the above characteristics are not attractive for
growing small borrowers, leading to the development of a gap in the
credit market as discussed below.

What Credit Gap Exists in African Financial Markets?
As a result of fragmentation, and because each lending unit cannot
alter the structure of its operations and products in the short to
medium term without additional flows of resources, there are few
lenders in Sub-Saharan Africa that meet the needs of borrowers
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interested in credit with the following characteristics: small loan
amounts up to $1,000, interest rates far below 30% per annum, and
a maturity of up to 18 months. That is what many small businesses,
often in countries with inflation rates well over 20%, ask for. The
most affected are microenterprises wanting to expand in small towns.
Credit gaps in various countries capture borrowers who cannot
access informal lenders, because they do not find the packages or
contracts of those lenders attractive for their purposes, and yet cannot gain access to the formal circles, because they are considered
ineligible. This does not mean small borrowers who want loans that
informal lenders provide are adequately taken care of. But if they
have not received credit, it is mainly because the nearest informal
lenders—for whom they are eligible—do not have enough resources
to provide them with loans. Their inability to obtain credit is seldom
because informal lenders do not want to lend to them. For the others,
no one can meet their demand cost effectively without significant
revision of institutional structures.

How Do Informal Operators Select Clients?
A characteristic of African financial markets is the weakness of modern contract enforcement mechanisms. Lenders lend small amounts
and have maturity periods that minimize costs, often in a way that
make their loans less attractive to businesses. In the absence of sound
formal contract enforcement, both formal and informal lending
institutions face the problem of managing risk with loan administration practices that suggest greater emphasis on loan screening than
on monitoring the use of loans and contract enforcement. Their
approaches might suggest a greater concern, the fear of selecting
noncreditworthy clients (adverse selection), even though clients’
changing their minds about loan use later (moral hazard) remains a
problem in the information asymmetry that lenders confront
(Nissanke & Aryeetey, 1996).
Screening in the informal sector relies extensively on personal
knowledge about borrowers. The development of personal ties and
the use of borrower proximity in decision-making are mechanisms
for countering adverse selection and moral hazard. The more rural
18
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the environment, the greater the need to personalize ties in confronting information asymmetry. Familiarity with borrowers often
reduces the significance of repeat borrowing. This explains why, in
such places as northern Nigeria, agricultural lending among relatives,
acquaintances, and neighbors is the norm. Susu collectors in Ghana
can take a decision on a loan request within one minute simply by
looking on the card on which deposits are entered to ensure that
borrower is a regular depositor. For a moneylender, new borrowers
are often introduced by persons a lender knows quite well and who
are prepared to guarantee payment with their word. This confines
their locus of operation to small areas.
In SCAs, as in cooperatives, loan screening is done at the time of
admission to membership. It assumes that a person requesting to join
the group is interested in a loan and will be admitted to the group if
he or she has characteristics similar to those of the other members,
including occupation and ethnicity in many cases. In screening applicants therefore, emphasis is not necessarily on whether members can
pay back loans they have taken, but on the commitment of members
to the group’s goals. Because group members invariably have similar
incomes and similar credit requirements, knowing the individual’s
character and how reliable they are is important.
The suggestion often made that informal lenders have a better
record on repayments than the formal sector mainly because of
constant monitoring of the uses to which loans are put does not
appear substantiated from a number of African studies (Nissanke &
Aryeetey, 1996). The form of monitoring often considered is regular
visits to project sites, but there is relatively little monitoring by informal lenders after loans have been given out. Moneylenders and other
informal groups seldom visit the project sites of their borrowers.
Obviously, when lending is localized, the need for project visits is
reduced. For moneylenders who are more likely to have borrowers in
other localities, monitoring is minimized because they always know
very well the persons who introduced borrowers to them.
Loan repayment rates generally tend to be much higher for
informal lenders than they are for formal lenders. Higher repayment
rates for informal lenders are not necessarily the result of more
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“aggressive” contract enforcement procedures. There is indeed little
evidence of litigation in courts. Collateral confiscation, in the absence
of proper ownership documentation and malfunctioning legal systems, is very difficult. Informal lenders go to clients’ homes to deliver
verbal warnings and threats. In membership arrangements, dismissal
of borrowers from groups is the most significant sanction.
The higher repayment rates of informal lenders are simply a
consequence of more efficient procedures for the retrieval of loans
and the borrowers’ knowledge that the informal lender has a higher
capability of actualizing threats to foreclose on collateral. For
example, when farmland is used as collateral, a bank is less likely to
foreclose on this without extra costs than a moneylender would. The
borrower knows that the moneylender can always find a relation to
farm on the land until a loan is repaid in full—an action that a bank
cannot take without incurring additional costs. Hence, for borrowers facing the two lenders, collateral has different meanings which
condition their attitudes towards repayment. They would not treat
the threat of collateral confiscation by an informal lender lightly. This
gives reason for risky SMEs to be cautious about dealing with the
informal financial sector.

What Are Direct and Indirect Linkages between
Formal and Informal Segments?
It is obvious that informal lenders could boost their business considerably if they could expand their lending base with resources from
the formal sector, and increasing loan sizes would be attractive for
SMEs. Direct or institutional linkages are expected to be shown in
actual flows of funds between segments. By indirect or market linkages, it is anticipated that activities in various segments will be
affected by activities in other segments through the influence of
financial markets. Both links are actually weak in most countries.
Thus, there is little evidence of informal lenders obtaining bank
loans for their lending businesses (Popiel, 1994; Nissanke &
Aryeetey, 1996; Bell, 1990).
With respect to indirect interaction between formal and informal
lenders, this remains less important. Expected competition between an
20
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institutional lender and an informal lender presents possibilities for
price interaction to occur, but this is based on the assumption of an
availability of “low-cost institutional credit” to informal lenders.
This seldom holds for Sub-Saharan African financial markets. In
view of deep market segmentation, informal lenders are hardly ever
persuaded by changes in formal sector loan interest rates to alter
their own rates. The fact that many informal rates have not been
altered in the face of significant increases in formal interest rates,
since financial sector reforms in the 1990s began in many countries,
indicates how “unrelated” pricing in the two sectors might be.

Recent Developments with Microfinance in
Sub-Saharan Africa
To counter credit market failures that result in the fragmentation
and exclusion of many potential borrowers from markets, a variety
of credit schemes have been introduced into many Sub-Saharan
African countries. But innovative credit schemes and microfinance
activities are far better known and more successful in Asia and Latin
America than in Sub-Saharan Africa. Apart from fewer programs,
their occurrence among countries varies considerably also. There
are countries with a good number of microfinance programs,
including Mali, Guinea, Burkina Faso, The Gambia, and Guinea
Bissau, and others with very few, including Sao Tome, Chad,
Mauritania, and Sierra Leone. K-REP in Kenya is probably the best
known microfinance scheme in Africa (Rosengard, 2000; SODECON, 1990).

Objectives and Strategies of
Innovative Schemes
Innovative credit-retailing schemes are usually community-managed
credit and savings schemes established to improve members’ access
to financial services, build a community self-help group, and help
members accumulate savings. Microfinance programs, generally
derived from innovative schemes, are more likely to be born out of
donor projects, and are not necessarily community-based. Indeed,
over 80% of enterprise development programs sponsored by donors
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have a microfinance component. More than half of such projects
focus solely on microcredit. For many innovative schemes, however,
credit provision may not be the only operational objective. Even for
those that perceive credit provision as the ultimate assignment, the
extent to which a direct supply of credit is present in their programs
depends on whether they adopt “minimalist” or “integrated”
approaches.2
Most of the acclaimed innovative schemes have been based on
the minimalist procedures. A recent trend emphasizes market principles. Through donor participation, many microfinance arrangements
have benefited from the best practices developed in other developing
regions. They have drawn some ideas from more successful projects
elsewhere, including the following: (1) issuing short-term loans;
(2) starting with small initial loans; (3) concentrating on providing
small working capital to firms with proven track records; (4) providing specialized services without targeting; (5) simplifying services; (6) providing localized services; (7) shortening turn-around
time for loan applications; (8) motivating repayment through group
solidarity or joint liability; (9) mobilizing savings from the poor; and
(10) charging full-cost interest rates.
Village banks, for example, emphasize making loans to finance
income-generating activities and savings. In establishing mechanisms
to lend to joint liability groups, these banks expect group members
to overcome collateral requirements. They lend on unsecured bases,
using five-person group guarantees whereby each individual is
responsible for the others and future access to credit is determined
by all members repaying loans. This is a principle borrowed from the
Grameen Bank.3 There are a number of microfinance projects in
Africa, however, that provide credit to individuals and projects.
K-REP has both group lending (through Watanos) and individual
arrangements with nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that onlend K-REP loans. A number of the schemes in Francophone African
countries have a mixture of group and individual arrangements.
The loan characteristics of microfinance schemes indicate that
their loans are comparable to those of most existing informal
arrangements. Loan maturities are generally short. Groups that borrow
22
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on-lending are expected to repay within a year. Members of the
small groups must repay their first loans within a few weeks, with
assurance that they can take a further loan from the revolving fund
established by the group. While interest rates are higher than most
formal lending rates in Africa, they tend to be lower than the rates of
moneylenders. Rates seem comparable to those of some of the best
known schemes in Asia and Latin America. Characteristics of these
loans suggest that a large part of Africa’s private sector cannot use such
facilities to finance investments. They are useful for the very poor
microbusinesses, similar to those financed by the informal sector.

Performance of Microfinance Programs
The assessments of the achievements of credit programs are centered
on repayment rates, loan sizes, savings levels, program costs, and
income from interest. Evaluations of repayment in Village Banking
programs have been high, averaging 90% in many places (Holt,
1991). Projects with high repayment rates often include the following
characteristics:
• training programs for participants
• interest rates not subsidized
• integrated formal written membership requirements and screening measures in their bylaws to ensure discipline among members
• a savings program accompanies lending
• an appropriate sociocultural environment, e.g., population not
transient, which helps to reduce default as social sanctions are
strongest in a stable population.
A number of recent evaluations of microfinance projects have
examined the extent of their outreach activities and their drive
towards self-sustainability (Christen, Rhyne, & Vogel, 1994).
Financial self-sustainability is achieved when the return on equity, net
of any subsidy received, equals or exceeds the opportunity costs.
Outreach is measured on the basis of the types of clientele served
and the variety of financial services offered, including the value and
number of loans extended, value and number of savings accounts,
type of financial services offered, number of branches and village
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subbranches, percentage of the total rural population served, real
annual growth of the institution’s assets over recent years, and participation of women as clients. Many such evaluations have questioned
the sustainability of projects, as well as their outreach (e.g., Webster
& Fidler, 1995; Kiiru, Pederson, & Nzioka, 1995).
It is important not to compare the achievements of African
microfinance programs only to those of other regions. It is possible to
explain further the backgrounds of these programs and to compare
their achievements with other institutional arrangements within the
region. Comparing innovative schemes and ascertaining their compatibility with known practices and attitudes in African countries,
reflected in informal systems, introduces a better understanding of
their difficulties. Various evaluations suggest that while innovative,
other microfinance projects are performing in making credit available,
local environments often constrain their ability to bring costs down
much lower than they presently are. They cannot go where the
informal sector can with their present set-up, hence providing a
justification for a link between them. Evidently both microfinance
and informal finance try to reach the same target group, but with
different structures. The African Development Bank (AfDB) has
developed a program in microfinance (see Appendix). But it is
important that care is taken to ensure a complementarity in the services provided by informal finance with a view to reaching those
that are currently not reached by either.

Increased Informal Finance and Microfinance for
Private Sector Development
The central problem for financial development in most SubSaharan African countries remains how to ensure that institutional
development and innovation leads to filling of the “credit gap” facing
SMEs. While they lack access to bank credit, their requirements
exceed limits of informal agents, as well as of many microfinance programs. There is currently limited scope for enhancing the allocation
of credit equitably and efficiently outside of a closer relationship
between the formal and informal sectors. As seen earlier, financial
system fragmentation can be wasteful. Closer linkages between dif24
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ferent segments can improve system efficiency by enabling different
agents to specialize for different market niches and by facilitating
flow of savings and credit up and down the system. Filling the credit
gap may require incentives to the formal financial sector to establish
conditions and support for informal and semiformal institutions to
move up to this market following an integration of the financial markets. The approach to a greater role for informal finance and microfinance focuses on the achievement of integrated financial markets:
how such integration might come about, and operational approaches
for bringing microfinance closer to small African entrepreneurs.
The proposal for integrated financial markets is based on a number of recent studies applying concepts from the “new” institutional
economics, stressing information asymmetry, transaction costs, and
risks. These studies have provided useful analytical tools to understand constraints that explain the persistence of fragmentation in
Sub-Saharan African financial markets, even when financially
repressive policies have been reformed (Chipeta & Mkandawire,
1996; Nissanke & Aryeetey, 1996; Popiel, 1994). In an integrated
financial market, direct and indirect linkages between the formal
and informal sectors are evident and significant. The flow of funds
among them is dictated by awareness of their respective specializations, allowing each segment to utilize information and the structural
advantages of others to enhance their own activities. The flow of
information is a major component of market integration.
There is an obvious need for national policy frameworks that
have appropriate levels of incentive and regulatory policies as a
context for achieving integrated financial development. In addition
to using such frameworks to provide a developmental platform for
financial institutions by helping them reduce and share risk with an
acceptable incentive structure, the framework should draw in
broader economic relationships by ensuring that the approach is
truly demand-driven by the real sector. Hence, while avoiding a
crowding-out of the private sector, maintaining steady growth of the
real economy is essential. A strong revival of informal finance in a
number of countries after reforms provides a good testimony to the
influence of a vibrant real sector on financial sector developments.
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Forging Links in Deposit Mobilization
Banks should be encouraged—and given incentives—to enter into
closer relationships with such informal agents as SCAs and NGOs.
These agents have the potential of becoming effective mechanisms
to mobilize deposits from and deliver credit to the household and
microbusiness sector. They can bulk up small savings at relatively
low cost and can retail more credit to the informal sector if backed
up by access to bank credit.
Indeed, taking a cue from what susu collectors in Ghana have
demanded of Ghanaian banks, banks in Sub-Saharan Africa could be
encouraged to offer informal deposit mobilizers preferential deposit
rates—higher than the rates of return on their other opportunity
sets—that encourage them not only to use the facility more and more
in view of financial gain, but also to discern recognition of their role
in savings mobilization by banks. In many West African cities where
transactions at bank branches take unusually long periods, “special”
clerks or tellers could be assigned to such frequent depositors as savings collectors at large branches they patronize in order to reduce the
length of time they spend at bank counters. Waivers of charges and
fees on demand deposits of informal deposit mobilizers by banks
would be seen as encouraging an institutional link between the two.
While direct contact between banks and informal deposit mobilizers will be very useful, semiformal institutions—savings and loan
companies—well-functioning finance houses, and credit unions also
hold considerable potential as shown by the review of the role of such
semiformal institutions. When markets are fragmented, it is best to
develop new institutions to integrate markets, and only then to
regulate. In a satisfactorily operating market-based economy, the
development of such new institutions is likely to take place if
demand for additional financial services exists. Governments only
need to be supportive.

Forging Links in Credit Allocation
The optimal way for banks and informal lenders to link up for purposes of credit allocation is to develop an agency relationship in which
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bank-loanable funds are channeled through semiformal (microfinance) lenders and informal lenders for on-lending to small borrowers.
Here also, operations of susu collectors4 in West Africa provide some
valuable insight into how such an arrangement could be pursued.
The realization of the full potential of informal finance units
lies in the identification of similar strong links between formal and
informal units. This relation should be oriented toward a two-way
flow of deposits and credits to enhance financial intermediation in
the region. While potential is much stronger in some countries than
in others, it must be developed wherever possible to ensure that the
benefits arising are for mutual growth. In eastern and southern African
countries as well as francophone countries—where cooperatives are
relatively well-developed—they could be the informal institutions for
developing such linkages.
Special incentives could be particularly useful in encouraging
banks to develop twinning arrangements with semiformal or nonbank
financial institutions, to provide these institutions with management
support as well as funds. For example, funds on-lent to microfinance intermediaries could be rediscounted at a concessional rate to
increase profitability to banks, or tax incentives could be provided
to compensate for the costs and risks of developing small borrower
portfolios. This would lead to the layering of credit supply through
different intermediary steps that involve a number of “shock
absorbers.” This is a principle well-known in informal finance in
those arrangements involving links with traders.
While the principle of channeling credit through informal
sources is acceptable, there is a need for caution with regard to which
informal agents can serve as good conduits for such lending. It is
important to rely more on well-established agents operating from
within recognizable bodies—associations, cooperatives, companies,
unions, etc. These have greater credibility than individuals. In a
number of countries, also, individual moneylenders with good longstanding relationships with banks could be useful. Channeling formal
credit to informal lenders can be defended on the grounds of efficiency
and increased financial integration, especially among small farmers.
Informal lenders can build a personal relationship with their borrowers
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that can ensure an extremely low loan default rate. The encouragement
of more subcontracting in the real sector would also generate more
financial linkages in parallel. For example, if leasing companies
could pass on tax benefits to banks to obtain better credit terms,
they could in turn pass on more financial services to their clients.

Government Policies for Enhancing Linkage Development
If banks have not linked up with informal finance and microfinance
institutions already, it is because of considerable distrust, inadequate
knowledge about the latter, and prejudice in some cases, all of which
create a risky environment for banks. Policy should be designed to
overcome this. There should be an approach to developing financial
systems that focuses on building institutions that serve identified
segments. There are two possible ways for policy to be used to
enhance the development of linkages between the various segments,
including the informal sector and such semiformal lenders as
NGOs—that is, the use of the fiscal system and of regulatory and
supervisory systems to provide incentives for formal institutions to
provide wholesale credit through informal agents.
Tax relief on profits granted to banks that allocate credit through
informal and semiformal agents could be recovered by imposing
higher taxes on banks that do not channel credit through the informal sector. Some banks—such as merchant banks—will have no
need to use informal agents for allocating credit and, therefore, will
be the actual financiers of the subsidy. Because the higher tax is on
bank profits, it should not be transferred to the users of those banks.
Regulatory and supervisory systems could be of considerable
importance in providing incentives to banks. If banks perceived that
risk was considerably reduced by dealing with credible semiformal
and informal agents, they would be encouraged to use them.
Effective regulation and supervision of semiformal and informal
institutions might tend to be problematic, in some cases, however.
Governments would require a proactive approach. This would
embrace a legal, regulatory, and prudential framework that fosters,
and when possible, accelerates financial market development. This
framework supports the setting up of mechanisms, institutions, and
28
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instruments that promote and facilitate this development as the
economy grows and as market functions expand. Regulation should
steer away from restrictive laws and focus on removing the obstacles
to financial market development. Restrictions on what assets banks
may hold could be modified to encourage them to invest in semiformal financial institutions. This requires diversification of formal
sector instruments. Commercial bills and bankers’ acceptances based
on cooperative or “mutualistic” guarantees should be developed to
establish a link between semiformal and formal financial institutions.
In sum, the development of a three-tier approach for lending to
marginal borrowers, mainly SMEs, would be very useful because it
provides an appropriate framework for regulation and supervision.
Banks would lend in the first instance to credible semiformal
agents5 who would then link with such informal lenders as susu collectors, cooperatives, and SCAs. Rural borrowers would receive
loans directly from informal agents. Where banks have good relations
with easily identifiable informal agents—e.g., the Association of Susu
Collectors in Ghana—there is no reason why the chain cannot be
shortened by directly dealing with that informal institution.
Semiformal institutions would in general be agencies for regulating
smaller informal units as they can identify operators much better
than any other external body.

Reducing Lender Risk for Microfinance Projects in Africa
Principles for reducing lender risk in integrated financial systems will
necessarily involve restructuring internal management leading to
improved appraisal of risk, the development of other tools for containing risk, and some risk-sharing procedures. Formal and informal
lenders and deposit-takers will have to learn to share risks with each
other while developing better techniques for dealing with borrowers
at the margin for whichever market niche they have adopted.
Techniques for lending to small borrowers minimize risk, and these
have seen significant improvement in the last decade throughout the
world. It is possible to reach small borrowers cost-effectively, taking
into account existing risk profiles of such borrowers.
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At the margin, financial institutions want to know whether it is
cost-effective to take deposits from and lend to small businesses.
Internally, they will have to adjust the credit-delivery methodology,
focusing on the way in which borrowers are identified, approved, and
supervised. Financial institutions that have been more successful in
extending and recovering credits to small enterprises have often based
their lending operations on an in-depth market assessment at the
design stage, allowing them to determine actual patterns of demand
and to identify and address the relative levels of risk involved.
Financial institutions lending to small borrowers must be profitable. They must earn enough to cover the cost of funds and recurrent
operational and administrative costs. This requires the use of interest
rates freely to assure profits, considering the negative impact too
high rates will have by way of incentive effects and the effects of
adverse selection. They must therefore strike a proper balance
between risk management and low transaction costs as a percentage
of average earning assets.
There are a number of innovative financial institutions that
have been successful in maintaining this balance. They have
employed a variety of measures to effectively reduce SME lending
risk, basing their risk reduction strategies on the fundamental
principles of:
• minimizing poor judgments on character and capability,
through careful credit analysis
• using intensified follow-up methods to track projects and loan
repayments
• applying “get tough” policies on repayment
It is interesting that many institutions are increasingly emphasizing nontangible aspects of creditworthiness—character, repayment
history, motivation to succeed—to reduce the likelihood of poor
credit judgment and the resulting need for intensive collection
efforts. One of the more successful microfinance institutions in
Africa has been the Senegalese Private Enterprise Credit Agency
(PECA) (USAID, 1989). It addresses the intangibles by carrying out
rigorous risk analysis of the potential borrower and business operation,
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including on-site observation of the business operation and interviews
with employees and key informants in the community about the
business operator’s character and debt repayment records. Personal
knowledge of the borrower or the person introducing the borrower
is generally accepted to be a crucial first step.
Indeed the principle of knowing the borrower is highly regarded
by the Malian Bank of Africa (BOAM)—an “alternative” commercial
bank—which bases risk management largely on “character lending.”
They require that each borrower be known by and receive the moral
guarantee of a member of the loan committee or a shareholder. In
Kenya, the project “Promotion of Rural Initiatives and Development
Enterprises” (PRIDE) also requires that all potential borrowers be
vetted by the executive committee governing their community level
market enterprise committee, and their immediate enterprise group
must agree to cross-guarantee the loan given. (See also, Morris &
Barnes, herein.)
Some institutions approach project-related risk with rigorous
analysis of project viability on the business site. If well done, with
the appropriate methodology, significant gains in risk reduction
could be achieved. PECA has tried this approach quite successfully.
PECA field officers develop business plans with enterprise owners
and conduct careful analysis of all risk factors—market, market
share, cost, and pricing structure—followed by similar independent
evaluations of the proposed projects by PECA management.
Also, the principle of lending to borrowers with a record of good
payments is generally applied by a number of successful institutions
lending to borrowers at the margin. Most of the loans undertaken
by PRIDE and PECA are made out to existing businesses with an
established business history and reputation. Initial loan sizes are limited and maturities are short-term. These conditions remain until the
borrower establishes creditworthiness. PECA negotiates subsequent
loans according to business needs. PRIDE provides loans in steps,
building up loan size to prepare good repayers to graduate into the
banking system. PECA tailors the loan size and repayment schedules
to cash flow.
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PRIDE uses a computerized accounting system to track savings
and loan performance. It has developed a credit reference system for
borrowers to be used as a centralized credit reference bureau with
banks and NGOs as partners. BOAM has introduced mobile field
officers to track SME loans in areas without branches.
In view of the high dependence of a large number of economic
activities in Africa on the agricultural sector—itself highly dependent
on uncertain weather conditions—it is advisable for entrepreneurs to
seek ways of reducing dependence. As entrepreneurs move away
from strong dependence on one sector, it becomes important for the
financial system to complement that move with its own diversification. Where feasible, financial institutions need to diversify their
loan portfolios to reduce their dependence on high-risk activities.
While this could be done through loan pricing arrangements, there
is often no guarantee that the desired results will be achieved in
poorly functioning market systems. PECA has taken direct actions
to diversify their portfolios as a risk reduction measure, to avoid sectoral concentration or overemphasis on lending in areas vulnerable to
natural calamities or external shocks.
An approach that seems to be catching on with some successful
financial institutions and which has been used quite effectively by a
few informal lenders when necessary has been the adoption of a tough
stance on contract enforcement. It has been shown that while collateral confiscation in the informal sector does not happen everyday,
knowledge that the lender could actually do it has often put some
fear into borrowers and encouraged them to make repayments on
time. Some nonbank financial intermediaries have begun a “gettough” policy on repayment. PECA ensures that any client not paying
within 10 days of the scheduled payment date is visited by a legal
officer. If loans are nonperforming for more than 60 days, action is
initiated to seize security.

Appendix: African Development Bank Microfinance
Initiative for Africa (AMINA): A Case Study
Microfinance institutions, which often represent the only access to
some form of financial services for microentrepreneurs and other
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disadvantaged groups, often lack professionalism and institution
capabilities. In an attempt to encourage and strengthen these institutions, the primary objective of ADB Microfinance Initiative for
Africa (AMINA) is to increase the access of the poor to financial services through capacity-building of microfinance institutions. The
economic and institutional viability of microfinance institutions is
key to their long-term sustainability. By developing permanent institutional capacity to serve microentrepreneurs, both outreach and sustainability are fostered, which is more effective over time than simply
giving grants, disbursing loans, or providing one-time training to
microentrepreneurs.
The weaknesses of microfinance institutions include the lack of
suitably trained and qualified personnel, appropriate operational
policies and procedures, and management information systems.
AMINA shall focus on long term capacity-building of these microfinance institutions through a coordinated program of technical assistance, creating linkages between microfinance institutions an
commercial banks and strengthening information dissemination
among microfinance networks.
AMINA will seek to assist microentrepreneurs, women, and
other disadvantaged groups in their development of productive
activities. The proposed model for the initial implementation of the
AMINA program has at its core technical and other assistance
designed to increase the professional capacity of microfinance institutions to respond to the financial service needs of the target groups.
AMINA will also attempt to establish and enhance linkages between
microfinance institutions and formal financial sectors, primarily
commercial banks. Finally, AMINA will coordinate its activities
closely with existing and programmed ADB activities and with the
activities of other donors, especially those that pertain to the financial
and private sectors. AMINA will serve as a mechanism to increase
horizontal linkages between microfinance practitioners and to engage
governments, regulatory agencies, and donors in a policy dialogue on
issues of concern to microfinance institutions.
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AMINA Program Objectives
The overall objectives of AMINA include:
• Providing technical and other assistance to nontraditional financial intermediaries, such as nongovernment organizations
(NGOs) and others who provide financial services to the poorest
sections of the population in low-income African countries.
This capacity-building sponsored by AMINA will strengthen
the ability of microfinance institutions to reach large numbers
of the target groups on a sustainable basis.
• Encouraging commercial banks and other formal financial sector actors to play a more active role in providing financial
resources for the target populations. AMINA will seek to create
linkages and greater intermediation between the formal financial
sector as wholesale providers of funds for distribution on a local
or retail level by microfinance institutions. It will also encourage
microfinance institutions to place savings deposits gathered from
the target populations with the formal banking sector.
Enhancing these linkages between the formal financial sector
and retail microfinance institutions will result in increased
monetization and financial deepening of the economy as a whole.
• Facilitating cooperation and coordination among aid donors,
private sector actors, and others involved in providing financial
services to target groups. AMINA will play an important role in
encouraging and facilitating information dissemination among
microfinance practitioners themselves. AMINA will also serve
to facilitate policy dialogue among donors, relevant government
agencies, and other interested parties on subjects relevant to the
provision of microfinance services, such as interest rate policies,
reserve requirements, and the like.
AMINA-sponsored activities seek to contribute to the economic and
social welfare of the program’s target populations through improved
access to appropriate financial services.
• Microenterprise development: employment opportunities are
created and incomes are increased among the rural and urban
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poor through improved access to a range of financial services,
including the provision of credit and savings mechanisms. This
leads to the economic empowerment of the marginalized and
disadvantaged members of society.
• Increased economic output, employment, and incomes: The
increase of economic opportunities among the poor and other
disadvantaged groups such as women yields more balanced economic growth for the economy as a whole, and more equitable
distribution of its rewards.
• A growing and dynamic private sector: microfinance expands the
ranks of new stakeholders in the economy through the empowerment of previously disadvantaged groups—women, landless
rural poor, and urban unemployed—by providing them a means
of attaining economic advancement. In addition to jobs and
income created, more broadly-based economic empowerment
advances the development of a more pluralistic society.
• Transformation of the private sector: as microentrepreneurs are
assisted by microfinance institutions and there is an increased
level of economic empowerment among previously disenfranchised societal groups, the private sector is transformed from
being reactive and poorly organized into a more cohesive and
effective force for political stability. A more broadly-based private sector in turn leads to a more accountable and transparent
economic, regulatory, and political system.

AMINA Program Components
In order to attain these program goals, objectives, and anticipated
outcomes, AMINA will engage in a coordinated range of activities.
These include technical assistance for microfinance institutions, the
issuance of financial guarantees to commercial banks who establish
refinancing facilities for microfinance institutions, and service as a
forum for policy dialogue and an information dissemination mechanism. An important undertaking of the AMINA program will be to
sensitize ADB professional staff to microfinance issues and techniques
through training sessions and participation in technical assistance
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activities for microfinance institutions. Their participation will likewise develop a heightened appreciation for the role of the private
sector and women in the overall economic development process.
AMINA will also support existing and planned ADB activities in
countries selected for implementation of the pilot phase of the program. Finally, AMINA will closely coordinate its technical assistance
and policy dialogue activities with other donors and initiatives active
in the pilot program countries. (Source: African Development Bank,
retrieved from http://www.afdb.org/about_adb/AMINA.htm)

Notes
1. See, for example, http://www.microcreditsummit.org/pubs/reports/socr/2004/
SOCR04.pdf
2. With the “minimalist approach,” the organization concentrates only on lending.
All activities that it engages in are designed to facilitate lending. These include the training of staff and also beneficiaries to the extent that they can comprehend how the loan
program works. Under the “integrated approach,” training and other forms of technical assistance are regarded as integral components of a whole scheme for assistance.
3. See website at http://www.gfusa.org
4. Susu collectors (usually male) visit shops, workplaces, market stalls, and homes
at agreed times on each day and collect funds towards a savings plan. Following this
plan, a saver agrees to deposit a specific amount determined by himself or herself in consultation with the collector for an agreed period of time—usually a month—after which
period, his or her deposits are returned less a day’s deposit.
5. These agents would include the numerous modern nonbank financial institutions (savings and loan companies, finance houses, credit unions, etc.) that are currently
observed in a number of countries.
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